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During the period covered by this survey, the Tennessee courts
have had occasion to decide some rather basic questions in the law
of contracts. These cases are the subject of comment. Other cases
involving only questions of burden of proof regarding contracts questions have not be commented on.1
I. AccoD AD SATISFACTION: PART PAYMENT OF A DISPUTED
CLAIM AS A DISCHARGE OF THE ENTIRE OBLIGATION

The Tennessee Court of Appeals case Tullahoma Concrete Pipe Co.
v. Pyramid Concrete Co.2 involved the question: When will a check
sent to a creditor in payment of a disputed claim and cashed by the

creditor discharge the claim? This dispute arose over a ten per cent
discount which the defendant debtor insisted should be allowed as a
custom of the trade. Checks for the total claim, less the claimed
discount, were sent to the complainant. After cashing the defendant's
checks and crediting the account of the defendant with their total,
complainant sued for the balance, representing the amount of the ten
per cent discount which complainant insisted had been improperly

deducted.
The sole question in the case was whether the cashing of the checks
from defendant under the circumstances amounted to an accord and
satisfaction, thus discharging the claim which complainant asserted
* Professor of Law, Vanderbilt University. Member, Tennessee bar.

1. J. W. Bateson Co. v. Romano, 266 F.2d 360 (6th Cir. 1959); John H. Moore
& Sons v. Adams, 324 S.W.2d 499 (Tenn. App. M.S. 1959).

2. 330 S.W.2d 578 (Tenn. App. M.S. 1959).
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against defendant debtor. When defendant remitted the first of two
checks to complainant, there was attached a stub showing the total
amount of the bill, less the deduction of the claimed ten per cent
discount. There was no notation on the check itself stating that it
represented payment in full. Upon receipt of the check with the stub
attached, complainant advised defendant by letter that it was holding
the check "pending adjustment on balance." By letter, defendant
replied to complainant, again insisting on the discount. A second
check for additional purchases was sent by defendant to complainant
to which a memorandum or stub was attached, defendant again deducting the ten per cent discount. As before, complainant held the
check "pending adjustment on balance."
Eventually, however, complainant cashed both checks from the
defendant and advised defendant that it was crediting their account
with the amount of the two checks, the same being partial payment of
the account. Upon defendant's continued refusal to pay the amount
of the discount deducted from the two checks, complainant sued.
On these facts, the chancellor decided for the defendant. Finding
that both parties were fully cognizant of the dispute before complainant cashed the checks, the trial court thought that these checks were
tendered by defendant as payment in full of the disputed claim, even
though the checks themselves did not expressly so state. Hence, the
trial court concluded that there was an accord and satisfaction which
discharged the whole obligation, since the complainant cashed the
checks knowing they were offered as payment in full of a disputed
claim.
The court of appeals reversed the chancellor, and held that there
was no accord and satisfaction discharging the debt. It allowed the
complainant to recover the amount of the discount claimed by defendant. There appear to be two main reasons why the court of appeals
concluded that there was no accord and satisfaction. First, the court
takes the position that it does not appear from the record that
defendant offered the checks only on condition that they be accepted
in full payment. Second, the court of appeals also said there was no
accord and satisfaction because the complainant did not accept the
checks with the intention that they should so operate as a satisfaction,
but instead made it clear before it cashed the checks that it was not
accepting the checks in full payment.
As a background against which to evaluate the two facets of the
law of accord and satisfaction raised by the court of appeals, perhaps
it would be helpful to distill a few pertinent propositions of law from
the cases.
It is well established that in the case of an unliquidated or disputed claim, accepting the payment of a lesser sum will discharge the
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entire debt.3 This is a species of contract known as an accord and

satisfaction. 4 This doctrine often finds application when a debtor
sends his creditor a check in payment of a disputed claim, informing
the creditor that the check is in full payment of the disputed claim,
and the creditor uses the check. Since this is a species of contract,
there must be present the elements of consideration, offer and acceptance.
A. Consideration
First, what is the consideration to support the creditor's promise
to take less than the full amount of a disputed or unliquidated claim?
It is settled that "the concession made by one is good consideration
for the concession made by the other."'5 The dispute need not be well6
founded in law, so long as the dispute is bona fide.

In the decision at hand, the Tullahoma Concrete Pipe Co. case, the
dispute arose as to the ten per cent discount which the defendant
claimed as a custom of the trade, and, from the opinion of the court of
appeals, appears to be a bona fide dispute. The court at least makes
no contention that the disagreement was not bona fide. Although no
issue of consideration seems to have been raised, yet at the threshhold there is implicit in the case the question whether the payment
of only that part of a claim which is admitted by the debtor defendant
3. Brackin v. Owens Horse & Mule Co., 195 Ala. 579, 71 So. 97 (1916);
Alcorn v. Arthur, 230 Ky. 509, 20 S.W.2d 276 (1929); Cone v. Equitable Life
Ins. Co. of Iowa, 310 S.W.2d 29 (Mo. App. 1958); In re Seidel's Estate, 5
App. Div. 2d 760, 169 N.Y.S.2d 210 (1957); Grubb v. Anderson, 198 Tenn. 492,

281 S.W.2d 241 (1955); Continental Ins. Co. v. Weinstein, 37 Tenn. App. 596,
267 S.W.2d 521 (M.S. 1953); Burgamy v. Davis, 313 S.W.2d 365 (Tex. Civ. App.
1958). The dispute need not be as to the amount; a dispute as to the method
by which a claim should be paid is sufficient. Gottlieb v. Charles Scribner's
Sons, 232 Ala. 33, 166 So. 685 (1936). For a discussion of this doctrine, along
with a large collection of supporting cases, see 1 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS §
128 (3d ed. 1957). Neither a promise to pay, nor the payment of, part of a
liquidated, undisputed claim is sufficient consideration to satisfy the whole.
Levine v. Blumenthal, 117 N.J.L. 23, 186 Atl. 457 (Sup. Ct. 1936); 1 WILLISTON,
CONTRACTS § 120 (3d ed. 1957). A questionable decision in Rivers v. Cole
Corp., 209 Ga. 406, 73 S.E.2d 196 (1952) held that cashing a check accepted
the condition that it was intended as full payment of the claim, although
there apparently was no dispute. A Tennessee statute provides that a new
agreement in writing to discharge a claim for a lesser sum will discharge a
liquidated, undisputed claim. TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 24-706, -707 (1956). However, a verbal agreement to take a lesser sum made without additional consideration is not binding. Winer v. Williams, 165 Tenn. 190, 54 S.W.2d 723
(1932).
4. See In re Seidel's Estate, 5 App. Div. 2d 760, 169 N.Y.S.2d 210 (1957);
Grubb v. Anderson, 198 Tenn. 492, 281 S.W.2d 241 (1955); Burgamy v. Davis,
313 S.W.2d 365 (Tex. Civ. App. 1958); 6 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS, §§ 1838-55
(rev. ed. 1938).
5. Hand Lumber Co. v. Hall, 147 Ala. 561, 564, 41 So. 78, 79 (1906).
6. 1 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS § 128 (3d ed. 1957) and cases collected. It is
generally held that if the claim, though asserted, is not honestly believed
to be at least doubtful, the release of it is not sufficient consideration.
Schram v. Dederick, 42 F. Supp. 525 (E.D. Mich. 1941); Berger v. Lane, 190
Cal. 443, 213 Pac. 45 (1923).
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to be due can constitute consideration for the entire amount, including
that part of the claim on which there is a bona fide dispute. It might
appear that in paying the part of the claim which the debtor concedes is due, he is merely doing what he was already bound to do,
and thus there would be no consideration to support the creditor's
promise to discharge the disputed amount. While there are decisions
to this effect,7 nevertheless by what seems to be the weight of

authority, the payment of the part admittedly due does constitute
consideration which will support a promise to discharge the
whole claim, including the disputed or unliquidated amount.8
This view regards the claim as a whole. By one line of opinions,
therefore, there would have been no accord and satisfaction which
would discharge claimant's claim in the Tullahoma Concrete Pipe Co.
case, because there would be no consideration to support the claimant
creditor's promise to discharge the disputed amount. The court of
appeals did not give any attention to this facet of the case, however.
Presumably the point was never raised.
So, even though defendant in the Tullahoma Concrete Pipe Co.
case paid only what was admittedly due, yet by the weight of
authority such payment contains all the ingredients of consideration
requisite to support an accord and satisfaction agreement which
would discharge complainant's claim for the amount of the disputed
discount.
B. Offer
Although the essentials of a sufficient consideration were present in
the Tulahoma Concrete Pipe Co. case, there still remains the question whether there existed the requisite offer and acceptance. The
court of appeals held that both the offer and acceptance were lacking.
Of course, nothing can operate as an accord and satisfaction without
the mutual assent of both debtor and creditor since this is a species
of contract. 9 The money must first be offered by the debtor in full
satisfaction of the disputed demand. Like any other species of offer,
there must be no uncertainty as to the condition intended. That is
to say, the offer by the debtor must be such that the creditor as a
reasonable man should understand that if he takes the check, he
takes it subject to the condition that it does constitute payment in
full. 10 If payment is made by check, the offer can be sufficient when
7. See extensive Annot., 112 A.L.R. 1219 (1938)

(showing that several

courts so hold).
8. See 1 WILLSTON, CONTRACTS § 129
CORBIN, CONTRACTS §188

(3d ed. 1957) and cases cited; 1
(1950); 6 Id. § 1289. On at least one occasion Ten-

nessee seems to have adopted this view. See Continental Ins. Co. v. Weinstein,
37 Tenn. App. 596, 267 S.W.2d 521 (M.S. 1953).
9. 6 WILmSTON, CONTRACTS § 1854 (rev. ed. 1938).

10. Canton Union Coal Co. v. Parlin & Orendorff Co., 117 Ill. App. 622,
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a check is given which on its face expresses that it is in full payment
or settlement of the demand." Also, as the Tennessee Supreme Court
has held, the offer is sufficient where a voucher attached to the
check apprises the creditor that the check is in full payment.' 2 That
was the method used in the case at hand.
The court of appeals, in the Tullahoma Concrete Pipe Co. case, held
that the defendant did not offer the checks to complainant on condition that they be accepted by complainant only in full payment of
the disputed balance. The chancellor who tried the case held that
the complainant did know when he cashed the two checks that they
were meant to be payment in full. There is considerable evidence
to support this finding by the trial court. As narrated by Judge
Shriver, who spoke for the court of appeals, the evidence shows clearly
that on both occasions when the defendant sent the checks to complainant as payment in full, defendant informed complainant of its
insistence on the ten per cent discount as a custom of the trade, which
is the amount in controversy in the case at hand. The checks sent
to complainant by defendant on two separate occasions for the amount
of the acount less the ten per cent discount, were accompanied on
both occasions by memoranda showing that defendant claimed the
discount. When complainant wrote defendant that it was holding
these checks pending adjustment in account, defendant again wrote,
reiterating its insistence upon the discount. Having all this knowledge, and with no acquiescence whatsoever on the part of defendant
to complainant's position, complainant cashed the two checks.
There seems ample evidence to support the trial court's finding of
fact that complainant knew, or reasonably should have known, that
the checks were offered in full settlement of the claim. There is a
presumption that the decree of the chancellor is correct. 13 Yet the
court of appeals reversed the trial court and held that, under all these
circumstances, complainant could not reasonably know that defendant
intended these checks to be payment in full of his obligation to
complainant.
aff'd 215 Ill. 244, 74 N.E. 143 (1905); Lovekin v. Fairbanks, Morse & Co., 282
Pa. 100, 127 Atl. 450 (1925).
11. Barham v. Bank, 94 Ark. 158, 126 S.W. 394 (1910) ("payment in full
to date"); Kall v. W. G. Block Co., 319 Ill. 339, 150 N.E. 254 (1926) ("for labor
to date"); Beck Elec. Constr. Co. v. National Contracting Co., 143 Minn. 190,
173 N.W. 413 (1919) ("in full for painting"); Grubb v. Anderson, 198 Tenn.
492, 281 S.W.2d 241 (1955) ("in full payment of all legal services rendered");
Continental Ins. Co. v. Weinstein, 37 Tenn. App. 596, 267 S.W.2d 521 (M.S.
1953) ("in full settlement of all claims"); Burgamy v. Davis, 313 S.W.2d
365 (Tex. Civ. App. 1958) ("payment of account in full").
12. Grubb v. Anderson, 198 Tenn. 492, 281 S.W.2d 241 (1955).

13. State ex rel. Henderson County v. Stewart, 326 S.W.2d 688, 690 (Tenn.

App. W.S. 1959).
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C. Acceptance-Manifest Intent
A second ground for the decision by the court of appeals is that
there was no accord and satisfaction because the complainant did not
accept the checks of the debtor with the intention that they should
so operate as a satisfaction, since complainant made it clear when
it cashed the checks that it was not accepting the checks in full payment. In short, the court of appeals said that even if there were a
valid offer, there was no valid acceptance that would bring into
existence an accord and satisfaction contract. It is most difficult to
agree with the court's conclusion that there was no acceptance.
To be sure, there must be mutual assent of the debtor and creditor
in order to constitute an accord and satisfaction, as in the case of
other contracts, but this does not necessarily involve subjective
mental assent.14 Since the formation of contracts depends not upon
the fallacious theory of an actual meeting of the minds, but merely
upon objective manifestation of assent, an intention to accept or not to
accept it is not the controlling factor.'5 When the claim is disputed or
14. See 6 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS

§ 1854 (rev. ed. 1938).
15. "Counsel contends that it thus appears that the minds of the parties did
not meet, and hence there was no contract. This is unsound. The court was
bound to look to appellant's express assent. It could not regard his secret or
undisclosed intent. Having agreed to pay when he came with his sheep, he
is bound by it, though he meant to say he would pay if he came. 1 WILUSTON

ON CONTRACTS, §§ 18, 20, 22." Higgins v. Cauhape, 33 N.M. 11, 261 Pac. 813,

814 (1927). "But it is now a settled principle of the law of contract that the
undisclosed intentions of the parties are, in the absence of mistake, fraud,
etc., immaterial; and that the outward manifestation or expression of
assent is controlling. This is the 'objective' standard, established by the

modern decisions and approved by authoritative writers." Brant v. California
Dairies, Inc., 4 Cal. 2d 128, 48 P.2d 13, 16 (1935). "In view of those authorities,
we hold that, though McKittrick may not have intended to employ Embry by
what transpired between them according to the latter's testimony, yet if what
McKittrick said would have been taken by a reasonable man to be an
employment, and Embry so understood it, it constituted a valid contract of
employment for the ensuing year." Embry v. Hargadine, McKittrick Dry
Goods Co., 127 Mo. App. 383, 105 S.W. 777, 779 (1907). The objective theory
of contract has been expressed by that great jurist, Judge Learned Hand,
as follows: "A contract has, strictly speaking, nothing to do with the
personal, or individual, intent of the parties. A contract is an obligation
attached by the mere force of law to certain acts of the parties, usually words
which ordinarily accompany and represent a known intent. If, however, iR
were proved by twenty bishops that either party when he used the words
intended something else than the usual meaning which the law imposes upon
them, he would still be held, unless there were some mutual mistake, or
something else of the sort." Hotchkiss v. National City Bank of New York,
200 Fed. 287, 293 (2d Cir. 1911). "It is likewise the contention of the
appellants that if a contract is plain and unambiguous it is a question of
law and it is the function of the court to interpret the contract as writtenaccording to its plain terms. It was their contention also that the intention
of the parties is expressed by the language of the contract when used in an
unambiguous instrument and must be given effect though it was not actually
the intention entertained by one or more of the parties to the contract. These
contentions are well supported by numerous authorities in this State and
elsewhere." Petty v. Sloan, 277 S.W.2d 355, 358 (Tenn. 1955). "In the law
of contract as in the law of tort, men are expected to live up to the standard
of the reasonably prudent man. If an offeror leads the offeree reasonably to
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unliquidated and the tender of the check gives the creditor notice that
it must be accepted, if at all, in full satisfaction, then the retention and
use by the creditor of the check constitutes an acceptance of the offer,
constituting an accord and satisfaction, which discharges the claim,
irrespective of the subjective mental intent of the creditor.16 The
use and retention of the check by the creditor, with knowledge of the
condition, is assent by the creditor to the condition imposed by the
debtor.' 7 Even though the creditor indicates by some act or word
at the time that he uses the check that his intention is not to treat
the debt as satisfied, nevertheless the creditor is still regarded as
assenting to the terms of the debtor's offer, for under such circumstances the debtor had reason to suppose that the taking of the check
is a manifestation of assent.18 What is said by the creditor when he
cashes the check is overridden by what is done, and assent is imputed
as an inference of law. 9 Or, as the Tennessee Supreme Court has
stated the matter in its latest word on the subject, when the creditor
cashes the check knowing it was intended as payment in full, then
acceptance is presumed and the creditor is estopped from denying
acceptance in full payment. 20 Thus, where the check shows that it is
intended as full payment, even though the creditor strikes out the
language showing it is given in full settlement before cashing it,21
or even if the creditor immediately notifies the debtor that he accepts
the check only in part payment, 22 nevertheless the retention and use
understand that certain terms are being offered and he accepts them, a
contract is made even though the offeror intended to make a different contract. So also, if an offeree accepts an offer without correctly understanding
its terms, he is bound by the terms as offered if a reasonably prudent man
in his place would have understood them. What the understanding of a
reasonably prudent man would be is a question of fact to be determined by
the court or the jury according to the usual rules." ANsoN, CONTRACT 33 n.1
(Corbin ed. 1930). To the same effect that the objective manifestation of
assent controls, rather than the subjective meeting of the minds, see Goltra
v. United States, 96 F. Supp. 618 (Ct. Cl. 1951); De Bobula v. Winston, 57
A.2d 742 (D.C. Munic. Ct. App. 1948); Hotz v. Equitable Life Assur. Soc'y. of
the United States, 224 Iowa 552, 276 N.W. 413 (1937); see 1 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS § 66 (3d ed. 1957); RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS § 20 (1932).
16. See 6 WILISTON, CONTRACTS § 1854 (rev. ed. 1938).
17. 6 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS § 1854 (rev. ed. 1938), especially note 6, supporting the textual material.
18. See 6 Id. § 1855 (rev. ed. 1938).
19. See Armour & Co. v. Schlacter, 159 N.Y.S.2d 135, 137 (Westchester
County Ct. 1957).
20. Grubb v. Anderson, 198 Tenn. 492, 281 S.W.2d 241 (1955).
21. Beck Elec. Constr. Co. v. National Contracting Co., 143 Minn. 190, 173
N.W. 413 (1919); Gribble v. Raymond Van Praag Supply Co., 124 App. Div.
829, 109 N.Y. Supp. 242 (1908); Roberg v. Evyan, Inc., 7 Misc. 2d 851, 163
N.Y.S.2d 729 (Sup. Ct. 1957); Toledo Edison Co. v. Roberts, 50 Ohio App. 74,
197 N.E. 500 (1934); Burgamy v. Davis, 313 S.W.2d 365 (Tex. Civ. App. 1958);
cf. Olson v. Wilson & Co., 244 Iowa 895, 58 N.W.2d 381 (1953) (seller accepted
and cashed, although with protest, a check for a smaller sum than seller
claimed); Nassoiy v. Tomlinson, 148 N.Y. 326, 42 N.E. 715 (1896) (real estate
broker, protesting, cashed check for commissions).
22. Barham v. Bank, 94 Ark. 158, 126 S.W. 394 (1910); Olson v. Wilson
& Co., 244 Iowa 895, 58 N.W.2d 381 (1953).
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of the check constitutes an acceptance of the debtor's offer, bringing
into existence an accord and satisfaction, which discharges the entire
obligation. If the creditor uses the check, when he should know that
it was intended as full settlement, then his claim against the debtor
is cancelled, and no protest or declaration of the creditor in a letter
to the debtor to the effect that he considered the check as only
partial payment will prevent the whole claim from being discharged. 23
Nor can the creditor be relieved of the results of his acceptance of the
check after he has once used it, although he tender the proceeds
thereof at the time suit is brought for the balance. 24
In the Tullahoma Concrete Pipe Co. case, the creditor cashed both
of defendant's checks after he knew that defendant insisted on the
discount. Cashing of the checks plainly was a manifestation of
complainant's assent to any condition that defendant may reasonably
have apprised complainant of. Under what appears to be virtually
unanimous authority, therefore, there was an acceptance by complainant of defendant's offer, whatever that offer reasonably meant,
irrespective of the fact that complainant made it clear that he was
not accepting the check in full payment. Also, it is submitted that
there is nothing in the language of the Tennessee cases cited by the
court of appeals, when properly construed, that would support the
court of appeals in its decision that the elements of an acceptance
were lacking. Moreover, the latest word by the Tennessee Supreme
Court is strong support for the position that there was an acceptance
in this case, bringing into existence an accord and satisfaction, which
25
discharged defendant's entire obligation.
II. CONSIDERATION: EMPLOYMENT AGREEMENTS TERMINABLE AT WILL
AS CONSIDERATION To SUPPORT EMPLOYEE'S PROMISE
NOT TO COMPETE
The Tennessee Supreme Court case of Associated Dairies, Inc. v.
Ray Moss Farms, Inc.26 presented the question whether an agreement
in which an employee agreed to work for an employer is supported by
23. Olson v. Wilson & Co., supra note 22; Nassoiy v. Tomlinson, 148 N.Y.
326, 42 N.E. 715 (1896); Armour & Co. v. Schlacter, 159 N.Y.S.2d 135, 137
(Westchester County Ct. 1957).
24. Shahan v. Bayer Vehicle Co., 179 Iowa 923, 162 N.W. 221 (1917).
25. Grubb v. Anderson, 198 Tenn. 492, 281 S.W.2d 241 (1955). There the
debtor defendant sent creditor complainant a check with an attached voucher
stating the check was in full payment of a claim, which was found to be
disputed. Plaintiff credited the amount of the check on account, later removed the voucher, and cashed the check. When plaintiff sued for a claimed
balance, both the trial court and court of appeals rendered judgment for
plaintiff. In reversing both courts, the Tennessee Supreme Court held, as a
matter of law, that plaintiff did accept the check, bringing into existence
an accord and satisfaction which discharged the entire obligation.
26. 326 S.W.2d 458 (Tenn. 1959).
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consideration when no time is specified for the duration of the agreement. In the instant case the employer, Associated Dairies, sought
to enjoin its former employee Byrum, and others similarly situated,
from violating a clause in the employment agreement in which the
employee promised not to solicit business from employer's customers
on behalf of another for a period of one year after termination of the
employment.
While defendant Byrum worked for complainant he was employed
as a sales driver. Complainant alleged that Byrum had violated his
agreement not to solicit complainant's customers. Byrum's agreement
under which he had worked for complainant specified no time for its
duration.
In denying the injunction, the court held that the agreement of
defendant not to solicit complainant's business for another was not
supported by consideration on the part of complainant, since the
agreement was terminable at will by either party. There was no
agreement that the complainant would retain the defendant for as
much as one day, said the court. Since there was no consideration to
support defendant's promise not to solicit complainant's customers,
there was no enforceable contract that bound defendant not to solicit
customers. The court then concluded that since there was no enforceable agreement, there was no breach by defendant to enjoin.
In finding that Byrum's promise not to compete was not supported
by a sufficient consideration on the part of the complainant, the
court trod the cindery path of orthodox consideration doctrine. An
agreement which may be terminated at will generally is regarded by
the courts as illusory and lacking in sufficient consideration. 27 However, at least one well-reasoned opinion by a court from a competent
jurisdiction has found the requisite consideration even though the
agreement reserved the right by one of the parties to cancel the
contract at any time. In Sylvan Crest Sand & Gravel Co. v. United
States,28 the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit interpreted such
a cancellation clause to mean that the cancellation clause implied
giving notice of intent to cancel, and found the giving of notice sufficient detriment to constitute consideration supporting the contract.
Moreover, even though a contract of employment specifies no term
of duration, and each party has power to terminate at will, after
performance has been rendered for a considerable time, the Supreme
27. Terre Haute Brewing Co. v. Dugan, 102 F.2d 425 (8th Cir. 1939); Rape

v. Mobile & O.R.R., 136 Miss. 38, 100 So. 585 (1924); Strobe v. Netherland Co.,
245 App. Div. 573, 283 N.Y.Supp. 246 (1935); Missouri, Kan. & T. R.R. v.
Smith, 98 Tex. 47, 81 S.W. 22 (1904). For a collection of many cases other
than employment agreements holding that there was no consideration because the court thought the promise was illusory, see 1 WiLmuSTON, CONTRACTS

§ 104 (3d ed. 1957).

28. 150 F.2d 642 (2d Cir. 1945).
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Judicial Court of Massachusetts has found that there is no lack of consideration, so as to prevent enforcement of the employee's promise not
to compete for a reasonable time.29
Even though the employment agreement may contain sufficient
consideration to support the employee's promise not to compete, it
does not necessarily follow that his promise in this respect will be
enforced. Refusal to enforce the restraining promise need not be
based on lack of consideration. Mr. Corbin, perhaps the leading
authority on the law of contracts, points out that an agreement not
to compete may be unenforceable because it is not reasonable under
all the circumstances. 30 In this connection, he observes that the courts
have to some degree required that the consideration for a restraining
promise must be adequate or at least reasonably so. 31 Applying this
proposition to employee's agreements not to compete, he thinks that
the limitation on an employee's liberty to work at his trade be adequately compensated if his agreement not to compete is to be enforced. 32 With respect to the existence of the power of an employer to
terminate a contract of employment, Mr. Corbin thinks that the
restraint provision should be held unreasonable and unenforceable if
it would have been so had the term of employment originally agreed
on been the very short period of the actual employment that has been
ended by the employer's cancellation under his power to do so. 33

III. PART PERFORMANCE AS A METHOD OF SATISFYING THE STATUTE OF
FRAUDS FOR SALE OF GOODS
One point involved in the Tennessee Supreme Court case of Foust
v. Carney34 called for an application and construction of that section
of the Statute of Frauds concerning the sale of goods or choses in
action of the value of $500. In order to induce plaintiff employee not
to accept employment elsewhere, the defendant employer entered
into an oral contract in 1949 with the plaintiff whereby defendant
29. Sherman v. Pfefferkorn, 241 Mass. 468, 135 N.E. 568 (1922). (Here we
have a "peppercorn" both literally and figuratively.)
30. See 1 CORBIN, CONTRACTS § 170 (1950).
31. Ibid.
32. Ibid. In Sherman v. Pfefferkorn, supra note 29, although a contract of
employment specified no term of duration, and each party had the power
to terminate at will, nevertheless after performance had continued for two
years there was no such lack of mutuality or consideration as to prevent enforcement of the employee's promise not to compete for a reasonable time
(three years). In Breed v. National Credit Ass'n, 211 Ga. 629, 88 S.E.2d
15 (1955), a written employment agreement which could be terminated by
one week's notice was not lacking in consideration after performance had
been actually rendered for two years at a good salary, and the employee's
promise not to compete for three years after termination was held to be
reasonable and lawful.
33. 1 CORBIN, CONTRACTS § 170 (1950).
34. 329 S.W.2d 826 (Tenn. 1959).
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agreed to increase plaintiff's salary, to pay plaintiff a bonus of five
per cent of the annual net income of a corporation, and to sell to
plaintiff twenty-five per cent of the capital stock of the corporation
at cost or book value. The stock was to be paid for out of the earnings
of the corporation over a period of six or eight years. Plaintiff sued
defendant for refusing to deliver the stock, after plaintiff had performed. The case was decided on complaint and demurrer. One
ground of the demurrer was that since the contract was oral, it was
not enforceable under that section of the Statute of Frauds which
provides that no contract for the sale of goods or choses in action of
the value of $500 is enforceable unless one of three things has occurred: (1) an acceptance and receipt of part of the goods or choses
in action by the buyer; (2) something given by the buyer in earnest
to bind the bargain or in part payment; or (3) a memorandum of the
35
contract signed by the party to be charged.
The Tennessee Supreme Court sustained the chancellor, who had
overruled the demurrer. The Statute of Frauds was held not applicable, because of part performance of the contract. The court expressly
adopted the reason set forth in Buice v. Scruggs Equipment Co. 36 to
support this result. In the Buice case, the defendant orally promised
that, in exchange for plaintiff's remaining with a corporation and
performing certain services, the defendant would sell plaintiff certain
shares of stock at a price substantially less than the market value.
Plaintiff did perform his part of the bargain. Upon defendant's refusal to perform, plaintiff sued for breach of contract. By way of
defense the defendant interposed the section of the Statute of Frauds
dealing with the sale of goods and choses in action. The Buice court
held that part performance of the contract took it out of the Statute
of Frauds, thus keeping the statute from being a defense to the suit
for failure to deliver the shares of stock.
In the Foust case, it is not clear just what the court regards as the
part performance which takes the agreement to sell the stock out of
the Statute of Frauds. The court talks about the paying of the increased salary, plus the payment of the five per cent bonus, but the
court has but little to say about the fact that the plaintiff continued
to serve in the employment of the defendant, as the possible part
performance which satisfied the requirements of the statute. It is
not clear from the Foust opinion how long plaintiff continued to serve
under the 1949 contract, but apparently he remained with plaintiff
until at least September 1954, at which time defendant allegedly
refused to deliver the shares of stock.
The conclusion by the court that a part performance takes a con35. TENN. CODE ANN . § 47-1204 (1956).
36. 194 Tenn. 129, 250 S.W.2d 44 (1952).
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tract for the sale of goods or choses in action out of the Statute of
Frauds is not accurate. In order to satisfy the Statute of Frauds, the
part performance must be made within the terms of the statute itself,
and the statute is clear and specific as to what acts of part performance
will render an oral contract enforceable, namely: (1) acceptance of
part of the goods, or (2) acceptance of something in earnest or part
payment.3 7 Any sort of performance that cannot be treated as either
acceptance of the goods, or acceptance of something in earnest or
part payment has been rejected as a method of satisfying the Statute
of Frauds. 38 The holding that the statute is satisfied by a part performance that is neither an acceptance of part of the goods nor an
acceptance of part payment is a judicially constructed avenue for
escaping the Statute of Frauds and is without foundation in the
statute.39 The Tennessee doctrine that part performance, other than
acceptance of part of the goods or part payment, is a method of
satisfying the Statute of Frauds as applied to the sale of goods and
choses in action appears somewhat more anomalous than it would in
most other states, since the doctrine of part performance has been
40
rejected for many years in Tennessee with regard to land contracts.
Yet the Foust case appears to be the third Tennessee case applying
the doctrine of part performance to contracts for the sale of goods and
choses in action, 41 without specifically requiring that performance
to be tantamount either to delivery of part of the goods, or acceptance
of something in earnest or part payment.
The statute in the Buice case, and probably the Foust case, would
have been satisfied under the terms of the statute itself. There was an
acceptance of part payment by defendant seller. The price for which
goods and choses in action are sold may take many forms other than
37. TENN.CODE ANN. § 47-1204

(1956).

38. Show of the Month, Inc. v. Shubert Theatre Corp., 202 Misc. 379, 109
N.Y.S.2d 484 (Sup. Ct. 1951).
39. Of course, too, the doctrine that part performance satisfies that provision of the Statute of Frauds which renders unenforceable a contract that
cannot be performed within one year, unless in writing, likewise is a judicial
graft upon the statute, but that is a well settled doctrine in most states.
Emerson v. Universal Products Co., 35 Del. 277, 162 Atl. 779 (Super. Ct. 1932);
Yates v. Ball, 132 Fla. 132, 181 So. 341 (1937), modified on rehearing (1938);

Richard v. Kilborn, 150 Kan. 579, 95 P.2d 545 (1939); Smith v. Cloyd 260 Ky.
393, 85 S.W.2d 873 (1935); Ware v. Poindexter Furniture & Carpet Co., 88
S.W.2d 718 (Tex. Civ. App. 1935), rev'd, 117 S.W.2d 420 (Comm. of Appeals
1938) (proof did not accord with pleading). See Annot., 6 A.L.R.2d 1053 (1949).
Likewise a graft on the Statute of Frauds is the well established doctrine
that part performance will satisfy that provision applicable to contracts for
the sale of land. See Annot. 101 A.L.R. 923 (1936).
40. Cobble v. Langford, 190 Tenn. 385, 230 S.W.2d 194 (1950); Goodloe v.
Goodloe, 116 Tenn. 252, 92 S.W. 767 (1905); Patton v. M'Clure, 8 Tenn. 333

(1828). See Note, Part Performance and Equitable Estoppel in Tennessee,

2 VAND. L. REv. 451 (1949), discussing the Tennessee doctrine.
41. In addition to Buice and Foust there is the case of Ashley v. Preston,
162 Tenn. 540, 39 S.W.2d 279 (1931).
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the payment of money. Whatever the parties agree upon as the price
constitutes that which is to operate as payment so far as concerns
the Statute of Frauds. 42 The rendition by the buyer of that which
the parties have agreed upon constitutes payment and satisfies the
statute.43 Thus, the agreed price may consist of services instead of
money or goods; and the performance of the services constitutes
payment, where the service is rendered as part of the price, given and
accepted in partial satisfaction of the seller's claim. 44 In the Buice
case the services performed by the plaintiff buyer for the defendant
seller was the consideration agreed upon as the payment for the stock.
Hence, the statute clearly was satisfied by reason of the fact that the
agreed payment, consisting of services, was given by the plaintiff
and accepted by the defendant. 45 The part payment need not be made
at the time of the deal. The oral deal becomes enforceable when part
46
payment is made later.
In the Foust case it is not too far-fetched to think that plaintiff's
continuing in the services of the defendant as a result of the 1949
contract was part of the bargained for consideration-and thus constituted "something in earnest or part payment"-for the shares of
stock, although the agreement provides that the stock should be paid
for out of the profits of the corporation. If the rendition of service by
the Foust plaintiff constituted part payment for the stock, then the
statute was satisfied by the part payment provision. The Foust
court apparently felt that the rendering of services by plaintiff constituted part of the purchase price of the stock. This is shown by the
fact that the opinion concludes that the promise to sell the stock was
"induced by the contract as a whole," and that it was not a "divisible
or separate part of the contract." 47 Indeed, the Foust court thought
that the promise to sell the stock was a "major portion of the agreement." Yet neither the Buice nor Foust opinions clearly purports to
say that the Statute of Frauds was satisfied because part payment
was given. The court talks in generalities about part performance
being the touchstone for escaping the statute.
The Foust opinion does not disclose whether any of the profits of
42. See 2 CoRBIN, CONTRACTS § 495 (1950).
43. Ibid., VoLD, SALES § 19 (2d ed. 1959).
44. Hightower v. Ansley, 126 Ga. 8, 54 S.E. 939 (1906) (services at specified
salary as part consideration for promise of interest in partnership; statute
satisfied); 2 CORBIN, CONTRACTS § 495 (1950); Driggs v. Bush, 152 Mich. 53,
115 N.W. 985 (1908) (buyer's work in bailing hay held to be part payment);
Conway v. Marachowsky, 262 Wis. 540, 55 N.W.2d 909 (1952) (rendering
service in payment for shares of corporate stock). The performance of alleged
services, in order to satisfy the statute, must be clearly done in pursuance of
the averred contract or referable thereto. Appolonio v. Baxter, 217 F.2d 267
(6th Cir. 1954).
45. Conway v. Marachowsky, 262 Wis. 540, 55 N.W.2d 909 (1952).
46. See VoLD, SALES § 19 (2d ed. 1959).
47. 329 S.W.2d at 829.
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the corporation actually had been applied as payment for the shares.
If so, that, too, should have satisfied the statute.
The loose statement by the Tennessee court that part performance
satisfies the Statute of Frauds is an imprecise statement of the
method by which the statute can be avoided. Although such imprecision likely did no harm in the Buice or Foust cases, yet such an
unclear and inaccurate statement could be vexatious and cause trouble
where the part performance was not tantamount either to an acceptance of part of the goods or an acceptance of part payment. The
payments of salary and bonus to plaintiff in the Foust case clearly
are not adequate to satisfy the statute, since they are not acceptance
of any of the goods or choses in action by the buyer, nor acceptance
of payment by the seller. Yet the court indiscriminately includes
them as part performance of the contract sufficient to satisfy the
statute.
In the Buice48 case, the Tennessee court quotes at some length from
American Jurisprudence49 to undergird the court's position that part
performance of a contract for the sale of goods and choses in action
satisfies the Statute of Frauds, and thus destroys that defense. This
compounds the likelihood of confusion that could result. An examination of this quoted authority reveals that the treatise is setting forth
the reasons why part performance satisfies that section of the Statute
of Frauds applicable to contracts for the sale of land. The broad doctrine of part performance as applicable to land contracts is said to be
without application to the sale of goods and choses in action.5 0 Moreover, it will be remembered that Tennessee is one of the three or four
states that wholly repudiate the doctrine that part performance will
satisfy the requirements of the statute applicable to contracts for
the sale of land. 51 Also, it is said by the authority quoted by the
Tennessee court in Buice that it is well settled, with only slight
authority to the contrary, that part performance as a method of
satisfying the statute applicable to land contracts is purely an equitable doctrine, applicable only to specific performance suits, and is
not available to sustain an action at law for damages for breach of
contract within the Statute of Frauds. 52 Both the Buice and Foust
cases were actions for damages for breach of contract.
The doctrine of estoppel has been invoked to defeat the application
of the Statute of Frauds applicable to the sale of goods and choses in
48. Buice v. Scruggs Equip. Co., 194 Tenn. 129, 137, 250 S.W.2d 44 (1952).
49. 49 Amx. JuR., Statute of Frauds, § 427, at 733 (1943).
50. Show of the Month, Inc. v. Shubert Theatre Corp., 202 Misc. 379, 109

N.Y.S.2d 484 (Sup. Ct. 1951).

51. See Annot., 101 A.L.R. 944 (1936). In addition to Tennessee, Kentucky,
Mississippi, and North Carolina are listed as repudiating the doctrine.
52. See 49 Am. JuR., Statute of Frauds,§§ 425-26 (1943).
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action, as well as other sections of the statute. 3 Perhaps the part
performance doctrine set forth by the Tennessee cases might find
shelter here, although neither the Buice nor the Foust cases expressly
base the decision on estoppel. In part, therefore, it may be a matter
of semantics. While the invoking of the principle of estoppel to
defeat the application of the statute is becoming more and more common, its limits cannot be presently stated. 54 Tennessee, while rejecting part performance in the land contracts as a method of satisfying the statute, reaches essentially the same result through the
avenue of estoppel. 55
Finally, it should be pointed out that there is nothing in the Foust
opinion to show that the stock in question had a value of $500, which
56
is necessary before the Statute of Frauds can even be a defense.
IV. STATUTE OF LIITATIONS: STOCK SALE CONTRACTS
Another ground of demurrer in the Foust case5 7 was the statute of
limitations. In 1949, the parties had entered into a contract under
which plaintiff promised to continue to work for defendant in
exchange for defendant's promise for an increase in salary and a
bonus out of the income of defendant's corporation, plus defendant's
promise to sell plaintiff certain stock. Plaintiff filed suit in August
of 1956 for defendant's failure to deliver the stock. The demurrer to
plaintiff's complaint averred that the action was barred by the six
year statute of limitations applicable to actions on contract, 58 Since
the cause of action arose when the contract was made in February
1949. Plaintiff's bill of complaint alleged, however, that the breach
occurred in September 1954, which was the first date that plaintiff
suspected that defendant was not going to deliver the stock. On that
date plaintiff severed connections with defendant. During the life
53. Estoppel was held to remove the bar of the sale of goods and choses

in action clause in Union Packing Co. v. Cariboo Land & Cattle Co., 191

F.2d 814 (9th Cir. 1951); Goldstein v. McNeil, 122 Cal. App. 2d 608, 265 P.2d

113 (1954). Estoppel was used as an avenue of escaping the "one year"
clause of the statute in Montgomery v. Moreland, 205 F.2d 865 (9th Cir. 1953);
Seymour v. Oelrichs, 156 Cal. 782, 106 Pac. 88 (1909).

54. Some jurisdictions will not apply the estoppel doctrine in the absence
of misrepresentation or concealment of a material fact, otherwise it is
thought that it would be too easy to circumvent the Statute of Frauds. Ozier
v. Haines, 411 Ill. 160, 103 N.E.2d 485 (1952). Other jurisdictions do not
insist on such strict requirements. Fibreboard Prods., Inc. v. Townsend, 202
F.2d 180 (9th Cir. 1953); Monarco v. Lo Greco, 35 Cal. 2d 621, 220 P.2d 737
(1950). For a comment on the subject, see Summers, The Doctrine of
Estoppel Applied to the Statute of Frauds, 79 U. PA. L. REv. 440 (1931).

55. Bloomstein v. Clees Bros., 3 Tenn. Ch. 433 (1877); see Note, Part

Performance and Equitable Estoppel in Tennessee, 2 VAND. L. REv. 451, 459
(1949) for a discussion of this doctrine in Tennessee.
56. TENN. CODE ANN. § 47-1204 (1956).
57. Foust v. Carney, 329 S.W.2d 826 (Tenn. 1959).
58. TENN. CODE ANN. § 28-310 (1956).
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of the contract, from February 1949 until September 1954, plaintiff
was paid the increased salary and bonus promised by that contract.
It is not clear what, if anything, had been paid on the stock. The
contract provided that the stock was to be paid for out of the profits
of the corporation over a six or eight year period, beginning February 1949. No time for delivery of the stock was specified in the
contract.
The court overruled the demurrer, holding that the statute of
limitations did not commence to run until September 1954 when
plaintiff for the first time learned that defendant was not going to
perform. The decision seems well-grounded. The statute of limitations does not begin to run on actions for breach of contract until
the time the right of action accrues, which is the time of the breach
of the agreement. 59 Since there was no specific time when the stock
was to be delivered, the delivery might well have been deferred
until the stock was paid for out of the profits of the corporation,
which was to be in six or eight years. If defendant had not repudiated
the contract before the stock was paid for, it is difficult to see how
plaintiff could properly have demanded the stock prior to the time
defendant had received payment for it. Payment for the stock would
thus appear to be a condition precedent to plaintiff's being able to
demand the stock. 60 If plaintiff was not entitled to demand the stock,
his cause of action can hardly be said to have arisen when the
contract was made in 1949.
V.

WAIVER OF CONDITIONS BY VENDEE: CONTRACTS FOR SALE OF LAND

The court of appeals case of Richardson v. Snipes61 consolidated
Richardson v. Snipes, with the case of Hall v. Snipes. Both cases
involved the effect of a waiver of a condition. Here only the Hall
case will be considered. The plaintiff Hall entered into a contract
with the defendant Snipes for the sale of a large tract of land,
known as "Josephine Plantation" in Mississippi, in part payment for
which defendant agreed to transfer to plaintiff certain real estate in
Memphis, Tennessee. Possession was to be given by January 1, 1958.
The contract provided that the consummation of the contract was
contingent upon part of the Memphis tract being zoned for commercial purposes. Unsuccessful efforts were put forth by the defendant to have the zoning completed by January 1, 1958, although
the court's opinion does not state whether the contract of sale expressly incorporated a deadline for the zoning to be accomplished.
59. See 34 Am. JuR. Limitation of Actions § 137 (1941).
60. Id. § 138.
61. 330 S.W.2d 381 (Tenn. App. W.S. 1959).
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Realizing that the zoning could not be accomplished by January 1,
1958, defendant, on December 4, 1957, requested the plaintiff to waive
the rezoning condition on the Memphis tract. This was the tract
which plaintiff was to get from defendant as part of the deal. But
before a waiver could be given, defendant repudiated the contract on
the ground of impossibility of performance of the condition regarding
the zoning. A waiver was given by plaintiff on December 6, which
appears to have been after plaintiff had received notice that defendant
had repudiated the contract.
Upon defendant's refusal to perform his part of the contract,
plaintiff sued. The chancellor who tried the case decided for the
defendant on the ground of "objective impossibility," and on the
ground that the waiver by plaintiff came too late. The court of
appeals reversed, holding for plaintiff. The condition in the contract
making its performance contingent upon re-zoning for commercial
use of the Memphis tract was held by the court of appeals to be a
condition exclusively for the benefit of the plaintiff; and that plaintiff's waiver of the condition was, in legal contemplation, the same
as if the condition had never been in the contract.
Perhaps a few propositions of law should be set forth as a background against which to evaluate the decision in this case. A condition
in a contract is inserted for the promisor's protection. If the promisor
desires to receive some performance from the other party, he may
attempt to secure his object by qualifying his own promise by
62
making it contingent upon the happening of a specified condition.
The legal effect of a condition precedent to the performance of a
contract is basically simple; no action can be maintained for a breach
of the conditional promise unless the condition has occurred or has
63
been excused.
In the case at hand the condition regarding zoning of the Memphis
tract did not happen; the property was not re-zoned commercially.
Was the condition excused? The court took the position that this
condition regarding zoning was exclusively for the protection of the
plaintiff, who was to receive this property as part of the deal; and
since it was for plaintiff's exclusive protection, he could waive the
condition and insist on performance from the defendant. If the condition regarding zoning was exclusively for the benefit of the plaintiff,
he could waive the condition and maintain an action against the
defendant, although the condition had not occurred. 64 The plaintiff
can let the defendant know that he does not insist on the condition,

62. 3 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS § 664 (rev. ed. 1936).

63. See 3 CORBIN, CONTRACTS § 628 (1951); 3 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS §§ 675-76
(rev. ed. 1936); RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS § 250 (1932).

64. See 3 CoRBIN, CONTRACTS § 752 (1951). See also Miller v. Moylan, 72
So. 2d 380 (Fla. 1954); Noble v. Garvens, 196 Wis. 308, 219 N.W. 954 (1928).
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although plaintiff was under no legal duty to do so. Plantiff has then
eliminated the condition and thereafter his duty is not conditional,
as it had been by the contract as made. 65 Moreover, plaintiff's waiver
of the condition, under such circumstances, does not discharge his
right to insist upon performance by the defendant. 66 Neither con67
sideration nor estoppel is necessary to eliminate the condition.
As we have seen, if the condition was, in part, for the benefit of
defendant, then no action can be maintained by plaintiff for the
breach of the defendant's promise, unless the condition has occurred
68
or has been excused by defendant.
Likely the condition in the case at hand was for the sole benefit of
the plaintiff, who was the purchaser of the Memphis tract to be
re-zoned. As the owner of the tract of land, plaintiff would be
the one interested in whether the property could be zoned commercially. Once the defendant had sold the tract to be re-zoned his
interest in its use ordinarily would terminate. 69 There is nothing to
show how defendant would have been benefitted by the zoning of
this tract after he had disposed of it. With the condition regarding
the zoning of the property being for his own benefit, the plaintiff
could properly waive it and insist on performance by the defendant. 70
Moreover, it would have been possible for plaintiff to waive the
71
condition after the breach by the defendant.
VI. ILLEGAL BARGAINS: CONTRACTS OF GOVERNMENT BODIES-QUASI
CONTRACTUAL LIABILITY

The Tennessee Court of Appeals case of State v. Stewart 2 presents
in a clear-cut fashion the question whether a county can be held
liable on quasi contract for benefits received under an agreement that
was illegal because it violated the statutorily prescribed mode of
contracting. An applicable statute provides that a purchasing agent
shall have exclusive power and authority to contract for and purchase all materials and supplies for the defendant county government.7 3 Another applicable statutory provision provides that the
county in question (Henderson) shall not be liable for the payment of
any purchases made contrary to its provisions.7 4 The County Superintendent of Schools of the defendant, Henderson County, purchased
65. Miller v. Moylan, 72 So. 2d 380 (Fla. 1954); Noble v. Garvens, 196 Wis.

308, 219 N.W. 954 (1928); see 3 CORBIN, CONTRACTS
66. See 3 CORBIN, CONTRACTS § 766 (1951).
67. See 3 CORBIN, CONTRAQTS

§ 752

§ 752 (1951).

(1951).

68. See textual material supported by note 63 supra.
69. See Funke v. Paist, 356 Pa. 594, 52 A.2d 655, 656 (1947).
70. Miller v. Moylan, 72 So. 2d 380 (Fla. 1954); Funke v. Paist, 356 Pa.
594, 52 A.2d 655 (1947); Noble v. Garvens, 196 Wis. 308, 219 N.W. 954 (1928).
71. See 3 CORBIN, CONTRACTS § 752 (1951).
72. 326 S.W.2d 688 (Tenn. App. W.S. 1959).
73. Tenn. Priv. Acts 1947, ch. 642 § 2.
74. Tenn. Priv. Acts 1947, ch. 642 § 8.
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supplies without complying with the pertinent statutory provisions.
Suit was brought by the complainant seller to recover the value of
these materials from the county. The trial court allowed recovery
and the court of appeals reversed.
Having satisfied itself that the statutory requirements were not
complied with, the court of appeals concluded that no recovery could
be had on contract because of the illegality of the contract. The court
then turned to the question whether or not recovery could be had
against the defendant county on the basis of quantum meruit for the
benefit received by the county. Since there is a positive statutory
prohibition against liability where the contract is not executed in
accordance with the statute, the court of appeals also denied recovery on a quantum meruit basis.
This case is in line with what apparently is the weight of authority,
denying recovery on quasi contract against public bodies, such as
counties and municipalities, for benefits conferred under a contract
made in violation of statutory restrictions and safeguards on their
mode of contracting.7 5 Recovery is denied for the reason that to allow
quasi contractual recovery would practically nullify the statutory
restrictions.7 6 On failure to observe the restrictions, the law will not
raise a quasi contractual obligation, although the public body has been
benefitted by the performance. The courts of this persuasion take
the view that if practical results are to be achieved by the restrictions
upon the powers of public bodies, no recovery should be allowed on
quasi contract, even though apparent injustice may result in some
cases adhering strictly to these restraints. 77 Restrictions on the form
and method of contracting are regarded as limitations upon the power
itself, and a governmental body cannot be held liable either by contract or quasi contract in defiance of such restrictions.7 8 The policy
behind the decisions denying recovery seems applicable alike to
counties and municipalities and the cases apply the restrictions
75. City & County of San Francisco v. Boyle, 195 Cal. 426, 233 Pac. 965

(1925); Jones v. Pinellas County, 81 Fla. 613, 88 So. 388 (1921); Guggenheim
v. City of Marion, 242 Ky. 350, 46 S.W.2d 478 (1932); McGovern v. City of
Boston, 229 Mass. 394 118 N.E. 667 (1918); Smith-County v. Mangum, 127 Miss.
192, 89 So. 913 (1921); Lutzken v. City of Rochester, 7 App. Div. 2d 498, 184
N.Y.S.2d 483 (1959); See 6 WLISTON, CONTRACTS § 1786A (rev. ed. 1938);
Annot., 84 A.L.R. 936, 954 (1933); 110 A.L.R. 153, 155 (1937); 154 A.L.R. 356,
362 (1945).

76. See, e.g., Scofield Eng'r Co. v. City of Danville, 126 F.2d 942, 947 (4th
Cir. 1942).
77. "[it is better that an individual should occasionally suffer from the
mistakes of public officers or agents, than to adopt a rule which, through
improper combination or collusion, might be turned to the detriment and
injury of the public." Whiteside v. United States, 93 U.S. 247, 257 (1876);
see 10 McQUILLAN, MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS § 29.26 (3d ed. 1950).
78. See City & County of Denver v. Moorman, 95 Colo. 111, 33 P.2d 749, 751
(1934); 10 MCQUILLAN, MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS § 29.26 (3d ed. 1950).
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equally to both kinds of governmental bodies.79 Where it is possible,
restitution in specie will be allowed when the contract is invalid
because of a limitation on the mode of contracting. 80
The question of the liability of governmental bodies in quasi contracts has never been satisfactorily worked out by the courts.8' As
might be expected, an increasing body of authority permits recovery
on quasi contract for benefits conferred to the extent that a governmental body was saved the expenditure of the taxpayer's money by
the receipt of the benefit.82 Where the illegality of a contract consists merely of irregularities as to directory matters relating to the
making of a contract within the powers of the public body, there
seems to be but little conflict, and recovery has often been permitted
where the public has received the benefit, either on quasi contract or
on the ground that the contract was ratified.83 Of course, the courts
of the several states differ greatly as to what limitations are to be
designated mandatory, with recovery denied, and what are directory
84
so that recovery will be permitted.
In the Stewart case, the restraint violated does not appear to be a
mere irregularity as to a directory matter relating to the making of
the contract, but rather a violation of a mandatory prohibition.
79. Counties: Layne-Western Co. v. Buchanan County, 85 F.2d 343 (8th
Cir. 1936); Jones v. Pinellas County, 81 Fla. 613, 88 So. 388 (1921); AmericanLa France & Foamite Industries v. Arlington County, 164 Va. 1, 178 S.E. 783
(1935); Annot. 154 A.L.R. 956 (1945). Municipalities: McGovern v. City of
Boston, 229 Mass. 394, 118 N.E. 667 (1918); Lutzken v. City of Rochester, 7
App. Div. 2d 498, 184 N.Y.S.2d 483 (1959); see 10 MCQUILLAN,
CORPORATIONS, § 29.26 (3d ed. 1950) and cases cited.

MUNICIPAL

80. Floyd County v. Owega Bridge Co., 143 Ky. 693, 137 S.W. 237 (1911),
plaintiff permitted to remove a bridge that had been built for a county on a
void contract.
81. See Tooke, Quasi-ContractualLiability of Municipal Corporations, 47
HARV. L. REv. 1143 (1934). For a valuable recent analysis of the problem, see Antieau, The Contractual and Quasi-ContractualResponsibilities of
Municipal Corporations,2 ST. Louis U.L.J. 230 (1953).
82. Ohio Oil Co. v. Michigan City, 117 F.2d 391 (7th Cir. 1941); American
La France Fire Engine Co., Inc. v. Borough of Shenandoah, 115 F.2d 866 (3d
Cir. 1940) (fire truck manufacturer recovered fair rental value of trucks
furnished to municipal corporation under a lease that was invalid for
failure to comply with statutory contracting procedures); American La
France & Foamite Industries v. Arlington County, 169 Va. 1, 192 S.E. 758
(1937) (seller recovered rent for equipment purchased under invalid agreement); Wakely v. County of St. Louis, 184 Minn. 613, 240 N.W. 1U3 (1931);
Sluder v. City of San Antonio, 2 S.W.2d 841 (Tex. Com. App. 1928).
83. De Leuw, Cather & Co. v. City of Joliet, 327 Ill. App. 453, 64 NE.2d 779
(1946); Commercial State Bank v. School District, 225 Mich. 656, 196 N.W. 373
(1923); New York, S. & W. R. R. v. Patterson, 86 N.J.L. 101, 91 Atl. 324
(1914); Appalachian Elec. Power Co. v. City of Huntington, 115 W. Va. 588,
177 S.E. 431 (1934). See Hudson City Contracting Co. v. New Jersey Incinerator Authority, 17 N.J. 297, 111 A.2d 385 (1955); 6 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS §
1786A n.3 (rev. ed. 1938); 10 MCQUILLAN, MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS § 29.26

(3d ed. 1950).
84. See Tooke, Quasi-Contractual Liability of Municipal Corporations, 47
HARV. L. REV. 1143, at 1162 (1934). For a recent criticism of this distinction,
see Antieau, The Contractual and Quasi-Contractual Responsibilities of
Municipal Corporations,2 ST. Louis U.L.J. 230, 235 (1953).

